Category: Erisa

Another “whipsaw” cash balance plan case to add to your reading list–West v. AK Steel Corporation Retirement Accumulation Plan, USDC So Ohio, 1:02cv0001. (No link available.) The issue presented in the case was whether the lump sum payments to plaintiffs complied with ERISA. The plan was paying out lump sum distributions equal to the hypothetical account balance. Plaintiffs’ contended that they should have been paid a higher amount equal to the actuarial equivalent of the annual benefit to which plaintiffs would have been entitled if they had remained in the plan until age 65.

The court held that the plan’s payment of lump sum distributions did not comply with ERISA and reiterated the positions espoused in other cases, upholding the resulting “whipsaw” effect. (The Treasury Department has defined this whole “whipsaw” problem in its recent cash balance plan proposals, issued in February of this year:

Three federal appellate courts have addressed the calculation of lump sum distributions under cash balance plans. Berger v. Xerox Corp. Retirement Income Guarantee Plan, 338 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2003); Esden v. Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. dismissed, 531 U.S. 1061 (2001); Lyons v. Georgia-Pacific Salaried Employees Retirement Plan, 221 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 967 (2001). All three courts held that a participant’s hypothetical account balance must be projected to normal retirement age using the plan’s interest crediting rate, converted to an annuity, and then discounted to a lump sum using the section 417(e) interest rate. If the plan’s interest crediting rate is the section 417(e) rate, the present value of the normal retirement age annuity will be the same as the hypothetical account balance. However, if the plan’s interest crediting rate is higher than the section 417(e) rate, the present value of the normal retirement age annuity – and the amount of any lump sum distribution – will be greater than the hypothetical account balance. This result is sometimes referred to as “whipsaw.”

These federal court decisions have followed an analysis set out in IRS Notice 96-8. Many plan sponsors have responded to whipsaw by limiting the interest crediting rate to the section 417(e) rate (or a deemed equivalent). This response effectively makes the section 417(e) rate a ceiling on plan interest credits.

While the West case is not a court of appeals decision, arguments which were rejected in the case are particularly noteworthy. (At one point in the opinion, the court goes so far as to call the defendants arguments as “creative.”) Of interest is the fact that the defendants in the case tried to argue that the “accrued benefit” under the plan was the hypothetical account balance, but the court noted that the plan document clearly defined it as a “single life annuity commencing at normal retirement age.” The court did indicate in dicta,however, that “[i]f the plan drafters had intended otherwise. . . they could have indicated that intent in the language of the Plan.”

The court went on to reject the defendants argument that, when projecting the benefit forward to an annuity at age 65 (for purposes of discounting back for the lump sum amount) the interest to be utilized should be governed by section 204(c)(3) of ERISA. Instead, the court held that the rate which should be utilized for projecting the benefit forward to an annuity at age 65 was the rate at which future interest credits would be calculated under the terms of the plan.

As far as the discount rate to be utilized in determining the lump sum benefit, the court relied on IRS Notice 96-8, Regulation section 1.411(a)-11(d), and previous cases which had upheld the Notice and Regulation, and rejected the defendants argument that Regulation section 1.411(a)-11(d) was invalidated when ERISA section 203(e) of ERISA was amended in 1994.

Please note that under the Bush administration’s cash balance plan legislative proposals, whipsaw would be eliminated prospectively, as indicated in the 2004 Blue Book entitled “General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2005 Revenue Proposals.” :

The proposal would eliminate whipsaw, providing that a cash balance plan may distribute a participant’s account balance as a lump sum distribution as long as the plan does not credit interest in excess of a market rate of return. The Secretary would be authorized to provide safe harbors for what constitutes a market rate of return and to prescribe appropriate conditions regarding the calculation of plan distributions. This would permit plan sponsors to give higher interest credits to participants, resulting in larger retirement accumulations.

More cash balance plan reading:

An article by Dallas L. Salisbury, president and CEO of the Employee Benefit Research Institute from BenefitNews.com–“Will cash balance plans survive?“

Read the story behind the Crowley v. Corning case from this recent article from the New York Times, “All the Nest Eggs in One Company Basket“:

Such stories abound in this company town, where loyalty, self-interest and faith in the company led many to bet their retirement portfolios almost exclusively on the stock of their employer. Economists said what happened here offered a pristine window on the mixed fortunes and stresses that come with retirement accounts based on company stock.

Read the resulting case–Crowley et al. v. Corning–and how the company’s motion to dismiss in that case was granted. Nixon Peabody LLP has a recent article on a later case–Crowley v. Corning Incorporated, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 758 (W.D.N.Y. 1/14/04)–in which the court addresses plaintiff’s motion to reopen the prior 2002 decision. Plaintiffs had sought to reopen the case by submitting “a handful of new cases, including the Enron decision and a similar decision involving WorldCom.” However, the court distinguished all of these cases and affirmed its prior 2002 decision in this recent 2004 decision.

The 2002 Crowley decision has been cited in numerous cases by defendants in ERISA 401(k) litigation involving company stock, and was cited by the court in the case of In re: Williams Cos. ERISA Litigation as pivotal authority in an unreported decision in which the court declined to to adopt the DOL’s interpretation of the law as espoused in the DOL’s Amicus Brief. (See this previous post where this unreported decision is discussed.) However, the DOL strongly notes in its WorldCom Amicus Brief that the Williams decision (which relied on Crowley) was “wrong” and “contrary to the weight of precedent.”

Defendants sought to rely on the Crowley case in the Dynegy case, Constance K. Schied v. Dynegy, Inc., et al. but their motions to dismiss were not granted. (Read the opinion in a recent Order Denying Motion to Dismiss.) Another case where defendants sought to rely on Crowley, but did not prevail, was in the In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. ERISA Litigation. (Read the recent Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in the Sears case.) Both the Dynegy and Sears opinions were rendered in March of this year.

The Department of Labor has issued Field Assistance Bulletin 2004-1 (“FAB”), providing some important guidance pertaining to the application of Title I of ERISA to health savings accounts (“HSAs”). Here is what the DOL had to say in the FAB:

Congress, in enacting the Medicare Modernization Act, recognized that HSAs would be established in conjunction with employment-based health plans and specifically provided for employer contributions. However, neither the Medicare Modernization Act nor section 223 of the Code specifically address the application of Title I of ERISA to HSAs. Based on our review of Title I, and taking into account the provisions of the Code as amended by the Medicare Modernization Act, we believe that HSAs generally will not constitute employee welfare benefit plans established or maintained by an employer where employer involvement with the HSA is limited, whether or not the employee’s HDHP [High Deductible Health Plan] is sponsored by an employer or obtained as individual coverage.

Again, the issue is employer involvement (as discussed in a previous post) and whether the particular benefit offered meets the exception under 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j)(1)-(4). Here is how the DOL decided to define employer involvement with respect to HSAs, as noted in their FAB:

Specifically, HSAs meeting the conditions of the safe harbor for group or group-type insurance programs at 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j)(1)-(4) would not be employee welfare benefit plans within the meaning of section 3(1) of ERISA. . . [W]e would not find that employer contributions to HSAs give rise to an ERISA-covered plan where the establishment of the HSAs is completely voluntary on the part of the employees and the employer does not: (i) limit the ability of eligible individuals to move their funds to another HSA beyond restrictions imposed by the Code; (ii) impose conditions on utilization of HSA funds beyond those permitted under the Code; (iii) make or influence the investment decisions with respect to funds contributed to an HSA; (iv) represent that the HSAs are an employee welfare benefit plan established or maintained by the employer; or (v) receive any payment or compensation in connection with an HSA.

This is a great article worth reading from CFO.com discussing the pitfalls of offering voluntary benefit programs–“The Doubt of the Benefit: Voluntary benefits may seem like a win-win. Here’s why they could be a lose-lose“:

Corporate benefits packages may be shrinking, but voluntary benefits are skyrocketing. According to a recent survey, 6 of every 10 companies now offer at least one voluntary, or supplemental, benefit. Employees buy such products—most often some form of life, health, disability, or dental insurance—directly from vendors, usually through a payroll deduction. It’s easy to see the appeal of voluntary benefits: they cost employers next to nothing, yet boost employee morale.

(Thanks to Benefitslink.com for the pointer to this article.)

The article quotes Joseph Belth, professor emeritus of insurance at Indiana University, as stating that employees are “being taken to the cleaners” on these policies:

[S]ome critics claim insurers are more inclined to dispute claims made on group policies purchased at work than those bought by customers on their own. Says Indiana University’s Belth: “It’s quite clear that an insurer is more likely to deny a claim if it’s ERISA than if it’s not under ERISA.” Few workers know this. Neither are they aware that if they sue, and their policy is deemed to fall under ERISA, the odds are stacked in favor of the insurers.

The article mentions how one insurance company allegedly noted in a memorandum that out of 12 claim situations in which the insurer had settled for $7.8 million in the aggregate, if the 12 cases had been covered by ERISA, total liability would have been no more than $500,000. (Read more about the denial of coverage problem in an article at Workforce Management called “Nasty Business.” )

Particularly inciteful in the CFO.com article are the ERISA-avoidance techniques compiled on the last page of the article here. (Scroll down to the bottom of the page.) However, the article correctly notes that if coverage is denied by an insurer, and the employee later brings suit, the employer could be at risk for liability under state law if the plan is deemed to be a non-ERISA plan. So, while trying to be a non-ERISA plan could achieve better results for the employee, this could, in the end, be a Catch 22 for the employer if things go sour.

(By way of reminder, generally “employee welfare benefit plans” are covered under ERISA. An “employee welfare benefit plan” is defined as a “plan, fund, or program” whose purpose is to provide its participants or their beneficiaries with certain nonpension benefits, or “welfare” benefits. “Welfare” benefits are defined under ERISA to include medical, surgical, or hospital care benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death, or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, holiday, severance, or similar benefits, or financial assistance for employee housing. The benefits may be provided for by the purchase of insurance or otherwise.

DOL regulation section 2510.3-1(j) provides an exception from ERISA for certain group or group-type insurance programs if, under the program, four conditions are met: (1) no contributions are made by the employer; (2) participation is completely voluntary for employees; (3) the sole functions of the employer with regard to the insurance program are—without endorsing the program—to permit the insurer to publicize the arrangement to the employees and to collect premiums from the employees through payroll deductions and remit them to the insurance carrier; and (4) the employer receives no consideration in connection with the program except reasonable expenses.)

Generally, these voluntary benefit plans are ERISA plans, unless they fall within the exception of DOL regulation section 2510.3-1(j) (just described), and it is this exception under ERISA, and the interpretation of the term “employer endorsement,” around which this whole controversy lies.

In closing, it does appear that these types of programs offer a great deal of risk to employers and employees, and that if employers do decide to offer them, it is better (although not foolproof) to structure them as non-ERISA plans with profuse “buy-at-your-own-risk” and “we-are-not-endorsing-this-program”-type disclaimers figured prominently in the offering.

At the ALI-ABA Annual Spring Employee Benefits Law and Practice Update held last week, Louis Campagna, Jr., Chief of the Division of Interpretations, from EBSA, discussed the recent mutual fund investigations and reiterated what has already been set forth in the DOL’s statement issued in February, 2004. Mr. Campagna stated that after the mutual fund scandals broke, the DOL was flooded with questions from plan fiduciaries wanting guidance regarding their duties under ERISA with respect to the investigations. Mr. Campagna discussed how statements made by the DOL in speeches (here and here) and in the statement issued in February are designed to reinforce that fiduciaries should not panic, but can take applicable steps to fulfill their duties under ERISA as follows:

(1) First and foremost is the requirement that plan fiduciaries be informed. He stated that prudence requires that, if fiduciaries are not informed, they are not exercising prudence as required under ERISA. If plans are invested in funds with providers under investigation, fiduciaries have a duty to contact the fund directly in an effort to obtain specific information about the nature of any alleged abuses. If the funds have been involved in market timing or late trading, fiduciaries have a duty to investigate the possible economic impact of the abuses on plan investments and perform an evaluation regarding such impact, as well as evaluate the steps being taken by the funds to limit the potential for such abuses in the future.

(2) Fiduciaries should take appropriate action where necessary. The guiding principle for fiduciaries, as stated in their guidance, is to to ensure that appropriate efforts are being made to act reasonably, prudently and solely in the interests of participants and beneficiaries, and that actions taken are fully documented.

(3) Plan fiduciaries should consider any steps available to make the plan participants whole, such as participating in lawsuits. However, fiduciaries should weigh the costs to the plan against the potential for recovery in such lawsuits before participating.

(4) Plan fiduciaries should consider other plan assets, not just mutual fund investments, which could also involve similar abuses and take additional action with respect to such investments, such as pooled separate accounts and collective trusts. Mr. Campagna mentioned that the DOL is currently investigating these type of investments for possible abuses.

(Comment: Please note that in remarks of Assistant Secretary Ann L. Combs To the Washington Forum of the U.S. Institute on March 8, 2004, Ms. Combs mentioned this investigation by the DOL and stated as follows:

EBSA is currently conducting its own review of practices by mutual funds and other pooled investment vehicles, such as bank collective trusts, as well as service providers and so-called “intermediaries” to such funds, to determine whether there have been any violations of ERISA. We are examining a sample of mutual fund and other financial service providers to see whether activities such as market timing or illegal late trading may have harmed retirement plan beneficiaries. Under ERISA, a mutual fund affiliate or other retirement plan fiduciary that engages in or facilitates market timing or late trading, causing losses to an ERISA covered plan, is liable to restore losses to the plan.

We are focusing on investment companies and banks that offer 401(k) services to plans more than employers who run their own retirement plans. We are looking for improper payments for directed investments, and whether retirement accounts have been used to facilitate market timing or late trading for clients.

I should note that this review is exploratory and not the result of specific evidence that investment professionals serving as fiduciaries have engaged in improper or illegal activity. We don’t know yet if there are any real problems here but we have an obligation to look.)

(5) Mr. Campagna discussed how plan fiduciaries have been very concerned about whether they can take any steps to address market-timing by plan participants. Fiduciaries have been particularly concerned with the impact these restrictions on market-timing might have on ERISA section 404(c) safe harbor protection. In an effort to address these concerns, the DOL stated in its guidance that imposing reasonable redemption fees on sales of mutual fund shares and/or placing restrictions on the number of times a participant can move in and out of a particular investment within a particular period would not affect the safe harbor protection of section 404(c). Mr. Campagna also emphasized that any such restrictions must be clearly disclosed to the plan’s participants and beneficiaries.

Pam Perdue, attorney with Summers, Compton, Wells & Hamburg and a panelist, emphasized the importance of disclosure. If the plan fiduciaries receive a statement from the provider regarding alleged abuses, her position is that the plan fiduciaries should make this information available to participants and beneficiaries. She also noted that courts have upheld the validity of market-timing restrictions on plan investments where there was adequate and prior disclosure of such restrictions to plan participants.

Panelists noted that fiduciaries should beware of targeting certain plan participants with market-timing restrictions since this could run afoul of the 3-day advance notice requirements for blackout periods under Sarbanes-Oxley.

(What is being referred to here are the requirements that apply to so-called “black-out periods” in participant-directed retirement plans under Sarbanes-Oxley. Black-out periods occur when the ability of plan participants (or of a plan participant) to take certain actions is temporarily suspended. Under Sarbanes-Oxley, participants must receive advance written notice of certain black-out periods, and corporate insiders are restricted in trading in employer securities during such black-out periods. The DOL and the SEC have issued final rules implementing the new requirements. Substantial penalties may be imposed for non-compliance with the black-out notice requirement or the insider trading prohibition under Sarbanes-Oxley.)

The DOL also emphasized this point in its guidance, stating that “[t]he imposition of trading restrictions that are not contemplated under the terms of the plan raises issues concerning the application of section 404(c), as well as issues as to whether such restrictions constitute the imposition of a “blackout period” requiring advance notice to affected participants and beneficiaries.”

(6) In the Q & A portion of the seminar, a question was asked as to whether or not the mutual fund guidance issued by the DOL applies to self-directed brokerage accounts. Mr. Campagna remarked that under SEC rules, the plan is the customer which buys the mutual fund product. Therefore, if information regarding funds targeted in an investigation is in the possession of the fiduciary, the plan fiduciaries would likely have fiduciary responsibility regarding the investment, and therefore the guidance would be applicable.

The Treasury Department and the IRS have issued proposed regulations that would permit employers to make simplifying changes to their retirement plan distribution options while protecting the rights of plan participants pursuant to secton 411(d)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code and section 204(g) of ERISA. You can access the press release here which provides as follows:

The regulations are based on suggestions received in response to a solicitation of comments published by the IRS in 2002 and 2003. Under the proposed regulations, an employer could eliminate an optional form of benefit if the plan retains a similar form with the same value or if the plan permits participants to select among a specified group of core options that have the same value as the eliminated form. The regulations would allow plan sponsors with many different payment options to simplify the number available; however, they generally do not permit elimination of a lump sum payment option.

More on this later . . .

The following articles give us some insight into what was discussed yesterday in arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court in the combined cases of Aetna Health Inc v. Davila, No. 02-1845, Cigna Healthcare of Texas v. Calad, No. 03-83. The main issue, of course, is whether ERISA preempts state law claims by ERISA plan participants or beneficiaries who assert that their employer’s health care plan did not cover certain services or products.

The New York Times: “Justices Hear Arguments About H.M.O. Malpractice Lawsuits“:

George P. Young, the patients’ lawyer, said the inability of people like his clients to recover damages under federal law had necessitated the state’s action. “What Texas has done is to fill a vacuum and say we are going to set out a professional medical standard of care when H.M.O.’s make medical necessity decisions,” Mr. Young told the court. He said that under the companies’ position “they would be free to say we’re going to use the medical-necessity standard of a witch doctor or whatever we decide it is.”

Both Justice Antonin Scalia and Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist indicated that they saw the dispute as one over the value of benefits rather than quality of care. “To say that the plan condemned them to not using Vioxx is simply not true,” Justice Scalia told Mr. Young. “All you’re talking about here is money. The claimant didn’t want to lay out the additional money for the Vioxx.”

CNN: “Justices appear split on HMO issue“:

In arguments Tuesday, the justices wrestled with conflicting definitions of care and coverage. “To make a coverage decision, doesn’t one have to make a medical judgment?” asked Justice John Paul Stevens. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor seemed to agree. “If you’re [insurance companies] telling doctors what’s medically necessary, then aren’t you defining necessities of medical care?”

The Washington Post: “Justices Seem Unlikely To Allow Suing Insurers”

But Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, echoing a point made earlier by health insurance company lawyer Miguel A. Estrada, replied that HMOs and other managed-care firms do not decide on treatment. “Their statement is they just won’t pay for it,” he said.

Mattax countered that a payment decision, based in part on a judgment about what the necessary and appropriate treatment would be, “is still a medical judgment.”

But Justice Stephen G. Breyer, while expressing sympathy for patients who are denied benefits, said that state lawsuits “seem to be the thing this [federal] statute forbids, and I don’t see a way around it.”

The Boston Globe: “Justices seem to back HMOs on a patient-rights question.“:

All but a few of the nine justices voiced negative reactions to a Texas law that allows patients to seek damages when an HMO denies coverage for treatment it says is not needed — despite a doctor’s recommendation. Texas is one of 10 states with such laws.

You can access many of the briefs filed in the cases at this link and this link.

For those of you following the In re: WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litigation, you may recall an entry in January of this year entitled “Directors and the Duty to Monitor Under ERISA” where I discussed the DOL’s Amicus Brief filed in the case and the issue being debated regarding the scope of the appointing fiduciary’s duty to monitor appointed fiduciaries under ERISA. If you would like to read the Memorandum of Law, prepared and filed by Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP in response to the Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to the Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, you can access it here.

The International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans has published an article entitled “Changes in Legal Landscape Turn Fiduciary Response Upside Down in 2004.” The article notes some interesting statistics:

A recent survey conducted by the investment advice firm, Financial Engines, found that 73% of plan sponsors believe their fiduciary responsibilities or liabilities have increased over the past 12 to 24 months. . . . At the same time, according to the survey, which was conducted at the beginning of February, only 48% of sponsors agree that their role as a fiduciary is clear. . .

The article makes a good point about the need for those advising retirement committees (attorneys, consultants, etc.) to educate and train the retirement committees about their fiduciary duties under ERISA. Dittos on this quote from Michael E. Falcone, a vice president with Aon Consulting’s Employee Benefits Group:

“I think one of the things they [attorneys, consultants, etc.] can do is do some fiduciary training for the committees, to make the committees aware of what their responsibilities are,” he explains. “But they also can talk about how they’re going to help the committees [fulfill]. . . their fiduciary duties. Make sure the fiduciaries have all the information they need to do their right job-disclosure on fees, fund reviews.”

Regarding ERISA fiduciary duty pertaining to company stock, the article makes the statement that “[a]mong the outstanding issues regarding company stock is whether sponsors have to disclose nonpublic data to participants” and that “[c]ourts have yet to rule on that question.” Please note that there have been some recent decisions holding that those individuals who serve on retirement committees and who are also corporate insiders with “inside information,” may under some circumstances have an obligation to disclose such information to other plan fiduciaries and participants. See Opinion and Order entered in the In Re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litigation and this post at Benefitsblog: “From My Notes: Review of the In re: WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litigation Opinion” as well as the Memorandum and Order entered in the In Re Enron ERISA Litigation which states:

The duty to disclose the relevant information to the plan participants and beneficiaries, which the Plaintiffs assert these Defendants owed as ERISA fiduciaries, is entirely consistent with the premise of the insider trading rules: that corporate insiders owe a fiduciary duty to disclose material nonpublic information to the shareholders and trading public.

Also, regarding fiduciary duties pertaining to recent mutual fund developments, the following articles discuss the DOL’s recent guidance issued addressing “Duties of Fiduciaries In Light of Recent Mutual Fund Investigations”:

• Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP: “Department of Labor Indicates That Companies Should Review 401(k) Plan Investment Options in Light of Mutual Fund Investigations”
• BNA Tax Management: “DOL Provides Fiduciary Guidance for Dealing with Mutual Fund Abuses”
• Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP: “DOL Provides Fiduciary Guidance for Dealing with Mutual Fund Scandal”
• Kilpatrick & Stockton LLP: “EBSA Assistant Secretary States Views on Market Timing and Late Trading“

You can read previous posts at Benefitsblog about ERISA fiduciary compliance at this link.

At the conference I attended this week, the cost of health care was one of the prevailing issues being discussed among HR professionals. In fact, at a seminar discussing health care and consumer-directed health plans, statistics were provided showing that by 2007, large employers (500+ employees) would be paying 2 times their 1999 health care premium rates for employees, while small employers (less than 500 employees) would be paying 3 to 3 1/2 times their 1999 rates. It is not surprising then that the Wall Street Journal today carried this article: “Health-Care Costs Blamed for Hiring Gap.” The article states:

The search is on for an answer to the most pressing question in the U.S. economy today: Why are businesses so reluctant to hire new workers? The popular answer is that business is hiring in India and China instead of the U.S. But there isn’t enough offshore outsourcing going on to explain the mystery. . .

The article makes a case that health care costs may be some of the answer:

The logic goes like this: For an employer, adding a worker makes sense when demand seems strong enough for the company to turn a profit from a worker’s labor. But adding a new worker means more than paying. There are also payroll taxes. And there are the costs of health care and pensions. With health-care costs surging, employers prefer to squeeze more work from workers on their payrolls — or rely more on temporary workers, who are much less likely to get health or pension benefits — than hire new workers. That gives rewards of extra labor without the cost of extra benefits.

Also, on the health care front, the Wall Street Journal is reporting: “GM’s Liabilities For Retiree Health Are Over $60 Billion.” (Subscription required.) The article states that “GM, the nation’s largest purchaser of health care, will soon report that its future health-care liabilities for retirees have surpassed $60 billion — even after recent Medicare legislation that has reduced retiree health-care obligations for many companies.”

And regarding California’s recently passed health care bill, SB 2, the California Health Care Foundation has posted some great information on the ERISA implications of SB 2 which you can access here as well as some excellent resources regarding the bill here.