Enzi Outlines Priorities for the Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee

U.S. Sen. Mike Enzi, R-Wyo., is expected to be the next chairman of the Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee (HELP) and has outlined his priorities for the 109th Congress. He announced plans for "closer scrutiny of the Departments of…

U.S. Sen. Mike Enzi, R-Wyo., is expected to be the next chairman of the Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee (HELP) and has outlined his priorities for the 109th Congress. He announced plans for “closer scrutiny of the Departments of Health, Education and Labor and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation,” for more affordable and accessible health insurance “by working to simplify and harmonize insurance market standards and regulations”as well as “meaningful Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) reform and Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) oversight.” In addition, a press release also mentions his plans for pension reform:

Enzi looks forward to a greater role in oversight and reform of our nation’s pension and benefits programs. He anticipates undertaking comprehensive pension reform to stabilize the private pension system to ensure the retirement security of hardworking Americans.

The press release goes on to note that Enzi was one of the authors of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and that, in the 108th Congress, he introduced the Retirement Security Advice Act of 2003, S. 1698, that would have promoted greater investment advice to workers in managing their retirement income assets.

Prohibited Transactions: A Good Return for the Plan is No Defense

Imagine the following scenario: A CPA and owner of a public accounting firm is sole trustee of the firm's 401(k) plan and is responsible for investing, managing, and controlling the plan's assets. Over a span of three years, the CPA…

Imagine the following scenario: A CPA and owner of a public accounting firm is sole trustee of the firm’s 401(k) plan and is responsible for investing, managing, and controlling the plan’s assets. Over a span of three years, the CPA decides that the plan can loan money to a number of companies in which the CPA owns a minority interest. The loans which amount to around $700,000 will bear interest at 12%, and will provide a good return for the plan. Because the CPA does not own 50% or more of the companies to which the plan will be loaning money, the CPA figures he won’t run afoul of the prohibited transaction provisions. (Under Code Sec. 4975 , a tax is imposed on a disqualified person (e.g., a plan fiduciary or a 50% or more owner of the plan sponsor) who participates in a prohibited transaction which includes a loan between a plan and a disqualified person.) Those were the facts in the recent Tax Court case of Joseph R. Rollins, TC Memo 2004-260.

However, the IRS had a different view of the transactions in that case. The IRS pulled out its arsenal of sections 4975(c)(1)(D) and (E) of the Internal Revenue Code and claimed that the CPA had committed prohibited transactions. Under those provisions, the IRS claimed that the “loans were transfers of the [p]lan’s assets that benefited” the CPA under sec. 4975(c)(1)(D) of the Code, and that the the loans were dealings with the plan’s assets in the CPA’s own interest under sec. 4975(c)(1)(E) of the Code. The IRS contended that the CPA was a disqualified person with respect to the plan in two capacities: (a) A fiduciary of the Plan (sec. 4975(e)(2)(A)), and (b) the 100-percent owner of the employer sponsoring the plan. The IRS held that the CPA benefited from the loans in that the loans enabled the borrowers–all entities in which the CPA owned interests–“to operate without having to borrow funds at arm’s length from other sources.”

When the Tax Court reviewed the facts, the court agreed with the IRS that the loans were prohibited transactions under section 4975(c)(1)(D), but held that it was unnecessary to decide whether the the CPA had also violated section 4975(c)(1)(E).

What were the CPA’s excise taxes that he had to pay for the prohibited transactions? Roughly $164,000, a hefty penalty for what in the end looked like a fairly good deal for the plan. The Tax Court reiterated its position that, just because an investment is good for a plan, doesn’t matter when it comes to applying the prohibited transaction rules:

After a review of the statutory framework and legislative history of section 4975 and the case law interpreting ERISA section 406, we conclude that the prohibited transactions contained in section 4975(c)(1) are just that. The fact that the transaction would qualify as a prudent investment when judged under the highest fiduciary standards is of no consequence. Furthermore, the fact that the plan benefits from the transaction is irrelevant. Good intentions and a pure heart are no defense.

Moral of the story: No matter how good an investment looks for a plan, ERISA fiduciaries, trustees, and certain owners and entities should get competent legal advice regarding application of the prohibited transaction rules when entering into transactions with retirement plans, especially in cases where common ownership exists or conflicts of interest issues are present. In the end, the court, in the portion of the opinion where it addressed the issue of whether or not it should impose the additional tax for failure to file an excise tax return, actually seemed to penalize the CPA for not obtaining competent advice:

Relying on his own understanding of the law, petitioner chose to sit “on both sides of the table in each transaction.” . . . Relying on his own understanding of the law, petitioner did not see any need to file section 4975 tax returns to report any of the transactions. . . . Petitioner’s good-faith belief that he was not required to file tax returns does not constitute reasonable cause under section 6651(a)(1) unless bolstered by advice from competent tax counsel who has been informed of all the relevant facts. Stevens Bros. Foundation, Inc. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 93, 133 (1962), affd. on this point 324 F.2d 633, 646 (8th Cir. 1963). There is no such evidence in the record in the instant case.

Also, the case is worth reading alone for its detailed discussion of the history behind the prohibited transaction rules.

Prohibited Transactions: A Good Return for the Plan is No Defense

Imagine the following scenario: A CPA and owner of a public accounting firm is sole trustee of the firm's 401(K) plan and is responsible for investing, managing, and controlling the plan's assets. Over a span of three years, the CPA…

Imagine the following scenario: A CPA and owner of a public accounting firm is sole trustee of the firm’s 401(K) plan and is responsible for investing, managing, and controlling the plan’s assets. Over a span of three years, the CPA decides that the plan can loan money to a number of companies in which the CPA owns a minority interest. The loans which amount to around $700,000 will bear interest at 12%, and will provide a good return for the plan. Because the CPA does not own 50% or more of the companies to which the plan will be loaning money, the CPA figures he won’t run afoul of the prohibited transaction provisions. (Under Code Sec. 4975 , a tax is imposed on a disqualified person (e.g., a plan fiduciary or a 50% or more owner of the plan sponsor) who participates in a prohibited transaction which includes a loan between a plan and a disqualified person.) Those were the facts in the recent Tax Court case of Joseph R. Rollins, TC Memo 2004-260.

However, the IRS had a different view of the transactions in that case. The IRS pulled out its arsenal of sections 4975(c)(1)(D) and (E) of the Internal Revenue Code and claimed that the CPA had committed prohibited transactions. Under those provisions, the IRS claimed that the “loans were transfers of the [p]lan’s assets that benefited” the CPA under sec. 4975(c)(1)(D) of the Code, and that the the loans were dealings with the plan’s assets in the CPA’s own interest under sec. 4975(c)(1)(E) of the Code. The IRS contended that the CPA was a disqualified person with respect to the plan in two capacities: (a) A fiduciary of the Plan (sec. 4975(e)(2)(A)), and (b) the 100-percent owner of the employer sponsoring the plan. The IRS held that the CPA benefited from the loans in that the loans enabled the borrowers–all entities in which the CPA owned interests–“to operate without having to borrow funds at arm’s length from other sources.”

When the Tax Court reviewed the facts, the court agreed with the IRS that the loans were prohibited transactions under section 4975(c)(1)(D), but held that it was unnecessary to decide whether the the CPA had also violated section 4975(c)(1)(E).

What were the CPA’s excise taxes that he had to pay for the prohibited transactions? Roughly $164,000, a hefty penalty for what in the end looked like a fairly good deal for the plan. The Tax Court reiterated its position that, just because an investment is good for a plan, doesn’t matter when it comes to applying the prohibited transaction rules:

After a review of the statutory framework and legislative history of section 4975 and the case law interpreting ERISA section 406, we conclude that the prohibited transactions contained in section 4975(c)(1) are just that. The fact that the transaction would qualify as a prudent investment when judged under the highest fiduciary standards is of no consequence. Furthermore, the fact that the plan benefits from the transaction is irrelevant. Good intentions and a pure heart are no defense.

Moral of the story: No matter how good an investment looks for a plan, ERISA fiduciaries, trustees, and certain owners and entities should get competent legal advice regarding application of the prohibited transaction rules when entering into transactions with retirement plans, especially in cases where common ownership exists or conflicts of interest issues are present. In the end, the court, in the portion of the opinion where it addressed the issue of whether or not it should impose the additional tax for failure to file an excise tax return, actually seemed to penalize the CPA for not obtaining competent advice:

Relying on his own understanding of the law, petitioner chose to sit “on both sides of the table in each transaction.” . . . Relying on his own understanding of the law, petitioner did not see any need to file section 4975 tax returns to report any of the transactions. . . . Petitioner’s good-faith belief that he was not required to file tax returns does not constitute reasonable cause under section 6651(a)(1) unless bolstered by advice from competent tax counsel who has been informed of all the relevant facts. Stevens Bros. Foundation, Inc. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 93, 133 (1962), affd. on this point 324 F.2d 633, 646 (8th Cir. 1963). There is no such evidence in the record in the instant case.

Also, the case is worth reading alone for its detailed discussion of the history behind the prohibited transaction rules.

HSA Road Rules

The HSA Coalition has issued a helpful document explaining many of the rules for setting up and using health savings accounts. The document is entitled "HSA Road Rules for Consumers, Employers, Insurers, Banks, Credit Unions & Administrators." (Thanks to Roth…

The HSA Coalition has issued a helpful document explaining many of the rules for setting up and using health savings accounts. The document is entitled “HSA Road Rules for Consumers, Employers, Insurers, Banks, Credit Unions & Administrators.” (Thanks to Roth CPA.com for the pointer.)

Blogs by Spitzer and Posner

It goes without saying that blogs are gaining in popularity, as evidenced recently by the appearance of two new blogs by individuals who have greatly impacted the benefits world. While they will obviously not be blogging about benefits, readers will…

It goes without saying that blogs are gaining in popularity, as evidenced recently by the appearance of two new blogs by individuals who have greatly impacted the benefits world. While they will obviously not be blogging about benefits, readers will undoubtedly want to visit now and then:

  • Eliot Spitzer has started a blog in conjunction with his announcement that he is running for Governor.
  • Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner has started a blog here which will “explore current issues of economics, law, and policy in a dialogic format.” In his first post, Posner writes about blogging in general:
    Blogging is a major new social, political, and economic phenomenon. It is a fresh and striking exemplification of Friedrich Hayek’s thesis that knowledge is widely distributed among people and that the challenge to society is to create mechanisms for pooling that knowledge. The powerful mechanism that was the focus of Hayek’s work, as as of economists generally, is the price system (the market). The newest mechanism is the “blogosphere.” There are 4 million blogs. The internet enables the instantaneous pooling (and hence correction, refinement, and amplification) of the ideas and opinions, facts and images, reportage and scholarship, generated by bloggers.

More on Executive Pay (via Broc Romanek). . .

If you practice in the executive compensation arena, you need to be reading Broc Romanek who is following developments pertaining to a new wave of executive compensation lawsuits. Read what he has to say here and here. One such lawsuit…

If you practice in the executive compensation arena, you need to be reading Broc Romanek who is following developments pertaining to a new wave of executive compensation lawsuits. Read what he has to say here and here. One such lawsuit names the CEO, other executives, directors and the general counsel and “seeks to recover money for the corporation almost solely on the basis that no corporate director could in good faith have allowed executives to have collected the amount of money that was paid” to them. (Quote from a Wall Street Journal article on the Fairchild lawsuit.)

He also writes about the SEC’s keen interest in the timing of option grants as evidenced by this “Legal Proceedings” section of a 10-K filing for a company (filed last week) which states:

We have received notice that the SEC is conducting an inquiry into our granting of stock options over the last five years to officers and directors. We believe that other companies have received similar inquiries. Each year, we grant stock options to a broad base of employees (including officers and directors) and in some years those grants have occurred shortly before our issuance of favorable annual financial results. The SEC has requested information regarding our stock option grants and we intend to cooperate with the SEC. We are unable to predict the outcome of the inquiry.

He also notes this speech by SEC Staffer, Chester Spatt, discussing whether or not there are “adequate safeguards in the setting of executive compensation” so that conflicts are adequately mitigated. Mr. Spatt asks the question: “Should there be additional fiduciary obligations on compensation consultants that advise the board of directors with respect to executive compensation?”

Finally, don’t miss Congressman Barney Frank‘s comments to “250 bank executives, regulators, and politicos gathered for the trade publication American Banker’s annual Banker of the Year Awards” (via the Boston Globe “frank talk from Frank” ):

According to remarks provided from the evening, Frank said: “I mean, do we really have to bribe you to do your jobs? I’m serious. I don’t get it. I don’t get a bonus. Cops don’t get bonuses. . . . And the problem is not just the bonuses. Think what you’re telling the average worker, that you who are the most important people in the system and at the top, that your salary isn’t enough, that you need to be given an extra incentive to do your job.”

As Broc’s title for his post suggests, “Is this a glimpse into the Congressional mindset on executive compensation?”

Preparing for Amendments to Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plans

The following article discussing new rules governing nonqualified deferred compensation plans will be published in the Greater Valley Forge Human Resource Association upcoming newsletter. (I serve as Legislative Chair for the association.) I am publishing the article here as well,…

The following article discussing new rules governing nonqualified deferred compensation plans will be published in the Greater Valley Forge Human Resource Association upcoming newsletter. (I serve as Legislative Chair for the association.) I am publishing the article here as well, since by the time it is published in the newsletter, it will likely need a rewrite due to soon-to-be-released IRS guidance expected in December. If you “google” the subject matter or search via Benefitslink.com, you will see that the internet has already seen a proliferation of law firm articles and publications on the topic. While there is not really anything new to report other than what most have already said about the subject, this article does contain some comments from Bill Sweetnam, Benefits Tax Counsel for the Treasury, made to practitioners at the recent ALI-ABA satellite webcast entitled “Annual Fall Employee Benefits Law and Update.”

Legislation Makes Sweeping Changes to Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plans: Be Prepared for Plan Amendments

The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (“AJCA”) made sweeping and dramatic changes to the tax rules relating to nonqualified deferred compensation plans. Such tax rules are the foundation for corporate executive compensation programs. The legislation adds a new section 409A to the Internal Revenue Code, which generally is effective with respect to amounts that are deferred in taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2005. Noncompliance with the new rules once they become effective will cause all compensation deferred under a plan for the taxable year and all preceding taxable years to be included in an affected participant’s gross income (if not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture) and subject to interest and an additional penalty tax of 20% of the compensation required to be included in income.

Amounts that are earned and vested before 2005 under a current plan are grandfathered as long as the plan is not materially modified after October 3, 2004. According to the legislative history of AJCA, a “material modification” includes the addition of a new benefits, right or feature, such as a disability benefit or death benefit, as well as acceleration of vesting, but the exercise or reduction of an existing benefit, right or feature does not constitute a “material modification.”

The rules extend to most plans or arrangements that provide for the deferral of compensation including, but not limited to:

  • Excess benefit plans
  • Supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs)
  • Elective deferrals of salary and/or bonuses
  • Section 457(f) plans maintained by tax-exempt and governmental employers
  • Stock appreciation rights (SARs)
  • Discounted stock options
  • Phantom stock

The following types of plans are exempt from the new rules:

  • Qualified retirement plans
  • Tax-deferred annuities
  • Simplified employee plans
  • SIMPLEs
  • Section 457(b)eligible deferred compensation plans maintained by governmental and tax-exempt employers
  • Bona fide vacation leave plans, sick leave, compensatory time, disability pay and death benefit plans
  • Code Section 422 incentive stock option plans
  • Code Section 423 employee stock purchase plans

Please note that the IRS has indicated informally that deferral provisions in employment agreements or severance plans may be subject to the new rules, and that the IRS will address these types of plans in their upcoming guidance. Also, the conference report makes it clear that plans covering non-employees (e.g. independent contractors, directors) are also covered by the new rules.

Summary of New Rules: Under the new rules, in order for a participant to avoid current taxation of deferred compensation and penalties, the deferred compensation arrangement must satisfy the following requirements:

1. Distributions must be made only upon separation from service, death, disability, change in ownership or effective control of the employer, unforeseeable emergency, or at a specified date. A participant will be considered to be disabled if either (1) the participant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, or (2) the participant is receiving income replacement benefits for a period of at least three months under an accident and health plan of the employer, by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. Payments to “key employees” of a publicly traded corporation may not be made in the first six months following the individual’s separation from service. (“Key employees” are officers earning at least $135,000 for 2005 -but not more than the first 50 officers, ranked by current year compensation-and some owners.)

2. The initial deferral election must be made prior to the beginning of the year in which the compensation is earned. However, with respect to “performance-based compensation” based on services performed over a period of at least 12 months, the election may be made no later than six months before the end of the performance period.

3. An election to delay or to change the form of payout is allowed only if:

  • Such election does not become effective until at least 12 months after the election is made;
  • Such election, if it relates to a distribution at a specified time, must be made not less than 12 months prior to the date of the first scheduled payment; and
  • The additional deferral with respect to which the election is made must be for a period of not less than 5 years from the date such payment would otherwise have been made (except in the case of an election related to a payment on account of the participant’s disability, death, or an unforeseeable emergency.)

4. Acceleration of any payout is prohibited. Many existing plans now include provisions that permit participants to elect to receive distributions of their deferred benefits subject to a penalty (referred to as a “haircut provision”). However, the new law would preclude participants from making such an election on or after January 1, 2005. In addition, changes in the form of payment that result in an acceleration of payments, e.g. election options which permit a participant to elect a lump sum over an annuity, would not be permitted.

5. Deferred compensation may not longer be funded using offshore funding arrangements.

6. A financial health trigger that results in a plan becoming funded will result in adverse tax consequences for a participant, even though the assets of the plan are still available to satisfy claims of general creditors.

The Department of Treasury has been directed by the Congress to issue guidance within 60 days after enactment of the law. The guidance will permit employers within a limited time frame to amend plans adopted prior to December 31, 2004 (1) so as to allow individuals to terminate participation in the plan or cancel an outstanding deferral election with respect to amounts deferred after December 31, 2004 or (ii) to comply with the legislation with respect to amounts deferred after December 31, 2004.

What Should Employers Be Doing Now? There are many unanswered questions that will need to be addressed in guidance issued by the Treasury. Until guidance is issued (such guidance is expected in December of this year), employers are being advised by practitioners to be taking inventory of all plans that might be affected. At a recent ALI-ABA conference (November 10, 2004), William F. Sweetnam, Jr., Esquire, Benefits Tax Counsel for the Treasury, stated that the new law will make nonqualified plans look more and more like qualified plans in that there will now be more specific legal requirements for such plans, new document requirements and operational requirements as well. Mr. Sweetnam urged employers not to “panic”, but to be taking inventory of their plans so that when guidance is issued, employers will be ready to take action and make amendments to their plans. He offered assurances that the Treasury will provide a transition period during which employers will be allowed to be bring their nonqualified plans into compliance with the new laws, even though the new rules technically take effect on January 1, 2005.

Also, practitioners are warning that employers who might seek to amend a grandfathered plan now to allow distributions in 2004, and to terminate the plan prior to January 1, 2005 to avoid application of the new rules, might end up actually running afoul of the new rules, since such an amendment would likely result in a “material modification,” meaning that the plan would no longer qualify for the “grandfather” rule.

Please note that the IRS has issued Announcement 2004-96 advising employers about an additional code for use on the 2005 Form W-2. The new code will be used to identify annual deferrals of income under a nonqualified deferred compensation plan covered under new section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code. The deferred amounts will be reported in box 12 of Form W-2, using Code Y.

Bottom Line: All nonqualified deferred compensation plans covered by the new rules will most likely have to be amended. The features of many current plans will no longer be permitted, and many plans will have to be redesigned. Employers will have to communicate these changes to affected participants.

Coming Soon: Mileage Taxes?

Our family wouldn't fare too well with this one: A tax based upon how many miles you drive. Read about it here: "Car use tax worth eyeing, official says." Then read "What's Scary About a Car Usage Tax in Massachusetts?"…

Our family wouldn’t fare too well with this one: A tax based upon how many miles you drive. Read about it here: “Car use tax worth eyeing, official says.” Then read “What’s Scary About a Car Usage Tax in Massachusetts?” from the Carpundit and “Taxman in the Sky: Using GPS to Track Drivers’ Auto Use” from Jalopnik (a car blog sponsored entirely by Audi).

A New Profession: Blogging Consultant

I guess blogging could become a profession for some, as discussed here in this article-"Why Would Companies Buy Bloggers?" Excerpt: So, why hire a blogger instead of just some writer off of eLance or Guru.com? The short answer is that…

I guess blogging could become a profession for some, as discussed here in this article–“Why Would Companies Buy Bloggers?” Excerpt:

So, why hire a blogger instead of just some writer off of eLance or Guru.com? The short answer is that you don’t just want a writer. The blogging consultant you hire should know how to write, know how to communicate (which is an entirely different matter) and know the business and marketing drivers which are likely to cause success or failure in this new venture.

Much like when you are starting a new software project you need more than just software developers, when you are starting a new blog you need more than just a writer: you need someone who (at least for now) is a leader in the blogging industry, who can walk you through the process and who can be a continuing resource to you and your company as the project evolves.

Common Law Marriage Abolished in Pennsylvania-Again

On November 23, 2004, Governor Rendell of Pennsylvania signed into law a bill abolishing common law marriage. According to the legislation, "[n]o common law marriage, contracted after January 1, 2005 shall be valid." The legislation also states that "[n]othing in…

On November 23, 2004, Governor Rendell of Pennsylvania signed into law a bill abolishing common law marriage. According to the legislation, “[n]o common law marriage, contracted after January 1, 2005 shall be valid.” The legislation also states that “[n]othing in this part shall be deemed to render any common law marriage, otherwise lawful and contracted on or before January 1, 2005, invalid.”

Now all of this is slightly confusing since there was also a Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court decision issued on September 17, 2003 (PNC Bank Corp. v. W.C.A. B., 831 A.2d 1269 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) which had purported to abolish common law marriage as well. You can read about that decision here and here. Neither party appealed the decision.

It would seem that it is pretty safe to say that common law marriages validly entered into prior to September 17, 2003 are still valid (since the decision in PNC was only applied prospectively), and that any common law marriages claimed to have been entered into after January 1, 2005 will be invalid. But what about those purportedly entered into between September 17, 2003 and January 2, 2005? The answer depends upon whether or not the Commonwealth Court decision is recognized. A dissent in the PNC case written by Judge Smith-Ribner (Judge Pellegrini joined in the opinion) argued that the Commonwealth Court did not have the power or authority to overturn common law marriage:

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because of my strong disagreement with a determination by an intermediate court of this Commonwealth that the right granted at common law to individuals to enter into common law marriage henceforth shall no longer exist. The majority usurps the function of the legislature and casts upon the people of this Commonwealth a change in common law that the majority has no authority or power to impose. When the people desire to abolish common law marriages, they should do so through their elected representatives in the legislature. The Supreme Court thought so in a situation involving the court’s power to change the common law duty of a parent for the support of a minor child. The court felt that a “more prudent course” of action was to await guidance from the legislature rather than to create duties or obligations by judicial fiat. Blue v. Blue, 532 Pa. 521, 616 A.2d 628 (1992). . . If the Pennsylvania legislature determines in its wisdom, as have the legislatures in New Jersey or in Florida, see N.J.S. §37:1-10, Fla. S. §741.211, and many other jurisdictions, to take up the issue of abolishing common law marriage then at that time it may well consider and debate many of the policy considerations expressed by the majority here for doing what it has no authority or power to do.

Also noteworthy is the fact that there have been two Pennsylvania Superior Court cases in which the Superior Court refused to be bound by the Commonwealth Court decision abolishing common law marriage, citing the fact that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the cases of Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 552 Pa. 253, 714 A.2d 1016 (Pa. 1998 and Interest of Miller, 301 Pa. Super. 511, 448 A.2d 25 (Pa. Super. 1982) had “declined the invitation to abolish common law marriage, deferring such action to the legislature.”

All of this means that employers who have employees in Pennsylvania will have to be on the alert for issues relating to common law marriage, probably for years to come. The issue could have serious repercussions for employers that fail to assess the important implications of the development. For instance, if an employee truly has a “common law spouse” under Pennsylvania law, that spouse could be entitled to certain spousal benefits under ERISA. The issue could arise where a retirement plan pays a participant-employee his or her benefits under a plan, without obtaining the necessary spousal waiver from the common law spouse, so that the plan could end up being liable to the spouse if the spouse later made a claim for such benefits. On the other hand, if a plan incorrectly pays out spousal benefits to a non-spouse beneficiary (an individual who is not considered to be married under Pennsylvania law), the plan could technically face a disqualification issue (if the plan is a “qualified” employee benefit plan under the Internal Revenue Code) and in addition, be liable for paying the benefits again to the correct beneficiary. There are numerous other issues under FMLA, COBRA, flexible spending accounts, health insurance plans, and other benefit plans which provide spousal benefits, which could be impacted as well.

Here are some initial steps for human resource professionals to take in response to this legislation (if they have not already taken action due to the previous PNC court decision):

(1) Alert employees about this development and notify them that they may want to seek the advice of an attorney if they believe they are in a Pennsylvania common law marriage.

(2) Develop plan procedures and processes for verifying the marriage status of employees. Those employers who utilize affidavits should make sure that their Summary Plan Descriptions and Employee Handbooks mention this procedural requirement since a Second Circuit case–Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan–held that a surviving spouse could prevail in a claim for spousal benefits where a Summary Plan Description failed to mention a plan’s procedural requirement that a domestic partnership affidavit be submitted to the plan administrator to qualify for such spousal benefits. Also, there should be language in the affidavit advising participants to seek legal advice before executing the affidavit since it could have far-reaching implications for the participant outside the benefits arena (i.e. as in the PNC case.)

And if the employer is unfortunate enough to receive an affidavit from a participant claiming to have entered into a common law marriage between the dates of September 17, 2003 and January 2, 2005, the employer should seek the advice of a qualified attorney.